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WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF 
THE LAW”? 
 




Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard 
by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the 
Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting 
factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of 
police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the 
police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the 
police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict 
violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, 
and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases 
together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development 
of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive 
examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive 
focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding 





The action against the police in Smith was brought solely under common 
law negligence and was heard by the courts on the defendants’ striking-out 
motion, with the facts treated as proved.3 The claimant, Mr Smith, had been 
the partner of Gareth Jeffrey. When the relationship became violent, they 
separated but in January 2003 Jeffrey began a campaign of violent, abusive 
* LLB (London School of Economics), MA Socio-Legal Studies, PhD, Barrister, 
Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham. 
1 On appeal from [2007] EWCA Civ 325 and [2008] EWCA Civ 39.  
2 Smith [2008] UKHL 50, at para [1]. 
3 In the case heard jointly, Van Colle, limitation restrictions meant that the action was 
based upon HRA, s 8. 
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and threatening messages. In February alone some 100 text messages were 
received, some of which were explicit, eg “U are dead”. On February 24th Mr 
Smith reported the situation to the Brighton police, who assigned two officers 
to the case. They immediately visited Mr Smith, who related the events to 
them. The police refused to look at the text messages Smith offered to show 
them, took no notes and no statement from Smith. They said that they would 
be tracing the calls and instructed Smith to attend the police station to fill in 
the paperwork, which he did the next day. 
The death threats continued and the claimant went to London. He phoned 
Brighton to check on progress of the case and was told that tracing the calls 
would take four weeks. He then went to Savile Row Police Station to report 
the ongoing threats. They made a call to Brighton and were assured that the 
case was being dealt with. On his return to Brighton on March 2nd Smith told 
an inspector that he believed his life was in danger. He was told that the case 
was progressing well and Smith should phone 999 if he feared for his safety. 
No note was made of the meeting. 
On March 10th Jeffrey attacked Mr Smith with a claw hammer, causing 
three skull fractures and associated long-term brain damage. Jeffrey was 
convicted of making threats to kill and causing grievous bodily harm and 
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. 
 
THE BACKGROUND LAW 
 
There are two basic elements of law relevant to this case. The first 
concerns the way that the tortious common law duty of care is established in 
novel situations. According to Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries Plc v 
Dickman (elaborating upon the neighbour principle of Donoghue v 
Stevenson), the requirements for imposing a duty are foreseeability, proximity 
and that it be fair just and reasonable.4 The extension of duties into contested 
or novel areas, such as that of police liability, should only be done 
incrementally and by analogy with existing duty situations. It has been 
pointed out that when invoking the third limb of Caparo, one is looking for 
positive reasons for recognising a new duty.5 The second element is that in 
the tort of negligence there is rarely a positive duty to act, in terms of 
protecting or warning, except where there are certain pre-existing 
relationships of control or the finding of an “assumption of responsibility”.6 
4 [1990] 2 AC 605, at pp 617-18. 
5  J Steele Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
6 Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549 is an example of the 
former and concerned an accident caused by a pupil of the defendant education 
authority. See also the recent case of Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 
11, below at n 56. 
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In Smith the harm was caused to the victims by a third party, not by the police 
who only failed to intervene. This area is further affected by the traditional 
reluctance of the law of tort to impose onerous duties on public bodies, such 
as police service authority.7  
It well is accepted that there is a non-problematic side to the negligence 
liability of the police. This is in the area of what can be described as civil 
operational tasks. There is no question that police drivers have a duty of care 
to other road users; additionally in cases such as Knightley v Johns8 and Rigby 
v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire9 they have been held liable for 
damage caused by the negligent carrying out of traffic control and use of CS 
gas respectively. The exact scope of the category in which this duty exists is 
of course debated and its boundaries were tested in Alexandrou v 
Manchester10 and Ancell v McDermott.11
Outside this relatively narrow range of duty situations there has existed 
what is effectively an immunity for the police, which has prevailed in the 
general area of crime prevention and investigation since the case of Hill v 
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.12 Here the House of Lords denied a claim 
brought by the mother of the last victim of the Yorkshire Ripper, the House of 
Lords set out an array of policy reasons for denying a duty of care by police to 
crime victims who alleged that had it not been for the negligence of the police 
in investigating the series of murders, her daughter would not have died. The 
facts failed to reveal the necessary level of proximity between Miss Hill and 
the police and, while this would have been sufficient to deny duty of care, the 
House of Lords adopted a “belt and braces” approach and additionally listed a 
number of policy factors which supported the denial. The most enduring of 
these will be discussed below. That the police should not owe a duty of care to 
potential victims when preventing and investigating crime was to be described 
as a “core principle” by Lord Steyn when Hill was reviewed and endorsed by 
the Lords almost two decades later in Brooks v Commissioner of Police for 
the Metropolis.13 Here they upheld the striking out of an action in which a 
friend of Stephen Lawrence had attempted to use negligence to challenge his 
treatment at the hands of the police, as a witness and victim of crime; 
arguably widening the immunity to exclude duties to witnesses as well. 
7 Other key cases have involved local authority social service and planning 
departments, education, and emergency services. 
8 [1982] 1 WLR 349. 
9 [1985] 1 WLR 242. 
10 [1993] 4 All ER 328. 
11 [1993] 4 All ER 355. 
12 [1989] AC  53. 
13 [2005] UKHL 24 at para [30]. 
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In the years between Hill and Brooks, the element of human rights law 
imported a new perspective into the duty debate: first in the form of 
significant appeals to Strasbourg and subsequently with implementation of the 
HRA which incorporated actions based upon Convention rights and 
jurisprudence directly into English law.  
The case of Osman v Ferguson14 featured facts with resonance for Smith.  
A schoolteacher who developed an obsession with a pupil stalked him, as well 
as his family and friends, made violent threats and a number of attacks against 
property. This conduct was reported to the police and despite assurances that 
there would be protection, the campaign culminated in two deaths and two 
woundings. A negligence claim against the police was struck out by the Court 
of Appeal on the basis of lack of duty of care, on the basis of the Hill “core 
principle”. There was, however, an appeal to the European Court of Human 
Rights. (hereafter ECtHR).15 In Osman v United Kingdom, there was held to 
have been a breach of art 6(1) “right to a court” in that the courts’ handling of 
the striking out procedure amounted to a blanket immunity in favour of the 
police.16 The important aspect was the view of the ECtHR “that Article 2 of 
the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a 
positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures 
to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another 




Although the Lords unanimously agreed that the facts of the case are very 
persuasive, by a 4-1 majority they rejected Mr Smith’s appeal and reasserted 
the Hill “core principle”.  Although there is some agreement that not all of the 
Hill policy reasons remain valid today, there ware two which still 
predominate. Firstly, that the finding of a duty of care in negligence would 
result in “defensive policing” and secondly, that the pressure to respond to 
legal action by individuals would divert police resources away from the 
performance of their primary public duties.18  
Lord Bingham supplies a strong dissent, motivated by a guiding principle 
which he has invoked in various duty of care debates: “the public policy 
14 [1993] 4 All ER 344. 
15 Osman v United Kingdom [1999] 1 FLR 193. 
16 See Z v UK [2001] 2 FLR 612 where this decision was agreed to have been based 
upon a misconception about the meaning of duty of care and the function of the 
striking out procedure in domestic law. 
17 At para [115]. 
18 A third is that the more appropriate remedy is the use of the police internal 
disciplinary procedures, which featured in Van Colle. 
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consideration which has first claim on the loyalty of the law is that wrongs 
should be remedied.”19 He postulates what he calls a “liability principle”:  
 
“…if a member of the public (A) furnishes a police officer (B) with 
apparently credible evidence that a third party whose identity and 
whereabouts are known presents a specific and imminent threat to his 
life or physical safety, B owes A a duty to take reasonable steps to 
assess such threat and, if appropriate, take reasonable steps to prevent 
it being executed.”20
  
This liability principle is devised to cover the Smith situation but not to 
directly encroach upon the decisions both Hill and Brooks of which Lord 
Bingham specifically approves. He distinguishes them from Smith in that the 
first concerned an ex post facto inquiry into the conduct of a police 
investigation and the second concerned the treatment of witnesses and alleged 
victims of crime. 
The majority opinions in Smith, however, found Lord Bingham’s liability 
principle would be difficult to apply in practice: what would be meant by an 
“apparently credible” or “a specific and imminent threat”? It is also too wide. 
Lord Hope notes that it would encompass threats to physical safety as well as 
life (although it is unclear how meaningful a distinction can be made between 
the two). It would appear, however, that the primary drawback is the threat it 
posed to the essence of the Hill policies.  Both this aspect and Lord 
Bingham’s agreement with Pill LJ in the Court of Appeal that there is “strong 
case for developing the common law action for negligence in the light of 




The Hill “core principle”  
 
The judicial approach to policy as a limiting factor in duty of care 
decisions, as it is embodied in the “fair, just and reasonable” component of the 
test for duty, is intrinsically fraught with subjectivity.22 Despite the Caparo 
exhortation to incremental development, unpredictability remains, and is 
perhaps exacerbated by the uncertain fit between the common law and human 
19 At para [56]. He first voiced this position in X v Bedfordshire County Council 
[1995] 2 AC 633. 
20 At para [44]. 
21 At para [58]. 
22 For a detailed consideration see J Bell  Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
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rights jurisprudence. Assertions as to the potential impact on professional 
practice and the financial implications of decisions are rarely accompanied by 
empirical evidence.23  
The capricious influence of policy was demonstrated in Swinney v Chief 
Constable of Northumbria Police24 when it was concluded that there could be 
a duty of care towards police informers. In this case, which pushed the 
parameters of Hill, Hirst LJ said,  “The public interest would be affronted 
were it to be the law that members of the public should be expected in the 
execution of public service, to undertake the risk of harm to themselves 
without the police, in return, being expected to take no more than reasonable 
care to ensure that the confidential information imparted to them is protected.” 
25 Here, the common good was perceived in terms of protecting the police, 
their informers, the public purse, and, ultimately the criminal justice system; 
rather than compensating ordinary citizens who were let down by them.  
Lords Hope and Carswell in Smith confidently assert that “the interests of 
the wider community” (quoting Lord Steyn in Brooks) lie in adopting the 
policy stance of Hill and Brooks to the facts under consideration.26 
Disturbingly, at the same time, they elaborate their positions in relation to 
domestic violence more generally. Lord Hope notes that domestic cases “are 
brought to the attention of the police all too frequently” and then notes the 
impact on police work elsewhere on giving undue attention to each 
complaint.27 Lord Carswell goes further: “One must recognise that police 
officers may quite properly be slow to engage themselves too closely in such 
domestic type matters, where they may suspect from experience the existence 
of a degree of hysteria or exaggeration on the part of either or both persons 
involved.”28
It is well known that the problem in domestic violence cases is not over-
reporting but rather under reporting.29 Furthermore not only does some 23% 
23 This is specifically acknowledged by Lord Phillips at para [102] where he proposes 
a statutory solution to the duty problem which he hopes may be informed by the Law 
Commission’s Consultation Paper No 187 (see below at p 6). An exception to the lack 
of evidence which supports policy decisions is provided in Smith at para [111] by 
Lord Brown who quotes statistics on witness intimidation.  
24 [1997] QB 464. 
25 At p 487. 
26 At paras [75] and [106] respectively. 
27 At para [76]. 
28 At para [107]. 
29 The 1996 British Crime Survey found that of those who had been victimised in the 
previous year, only 17% had reported it to the police and half had not told anyone. 
The British Crime Survey: England and Wales (London: Home Office, 1996) cited at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors191.pdf at p vii. For further details on 
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of violent crime occur in domestic settings,30 but, apropos Smith, the time of 
relationship breakdown is one of the most dangerous. Given the fact that 
every week an average of two women in Britain are killed by a partner or 
former partner and that one in four women and one in 6 men will suffer 
domestic abuse at some time in their lives, it is a disquieting interpretation of 
the public interest which leads the two Law Lords to their somewhat cynical 
position on the police response to the threats such as those in Smith. 
The two enduring justifications for Hill’s "core principle” require further 
thought. Probably the most potent is that imposition of duty of care will have 
a deleterious effect on policing, in creating a “defensive frame of mind.”31 No 
evidence is put forward to support this hypothesis. Given that the spectre of 
defensive practice arises in relation to all professions that are vulnerable to 
negligence claims, with medicine being the most prominent, it must be asked 
what is it about policing which sets it apart? When the issue is investigation 
and prevention of crime, the negative outcome envisaged would have 
implications for civil liberties in terms of increased surveillance, stop and 
search, arrest and even prosecution – impliedly on less than substantial 
grounds.32 In medicine, we know that defensiveness supposedly induced by 
negligence liability might lead to unnecessary expense or treatment – an 
impact on individuals and public resources different but not less profound 
than that hypothesised regarding policing. Lord Bingham believes that 
defensiveness, while a possible detriment in the Hill-type investigative 
situation, would not apply to the protective function covered by his “liability 
principle”. He reiterates that all that is required of the police is what is 
reasonable in the circumstances. As with other professionals and callings, the 
enforcement of standards of care may be seen to lead to good practice. As 
Michael Jones said of social work, “The only ‘defensive’ strategy likely to 
succeed … is for the professional to exercise reasonable care in reaching a 
judgment as to the appropriate course of action to take.”33  
The second main plank of the Hill core is the concern that the existence of 
a duty of care would result in a significant diversion of police resources to 
fighting litigation. This must be a real and negative prospect although, again, 
its extent is not predicted by any empirical evidence. The potential amount of 
 
best practice police response to domestic violence see guidelines from the Association 
of Chief of Police Officers: www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/data/Guidelines. 
30 The British Crime Survey: England and Wales (London: Home Office, 2000) cited 
in S Choudhry and J Herring “Domestic Violence and the Human Rights Act 1998: A 
New means of Legal Intervention?” (2006) PL 752-84 at 752. 
31 Smith at para [30]. 
32 As itemised by Lord Brown at para [132]. 
33 M Jones “Case Comment: Child Abuse: When the Professional Gets it Wrong” 
(2006) Med L Rev 264 at 265. 
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litigation would, of course, be affected by how stringent were the 
requirements around the threshold of breach and this would emerge with case 
law. Lord Brown recognises that this argument is weakened by the fact that 
the police are now having to contest human rights litigation.34 It must also be 
reiterated that police resources have long been required to meet ordinary 
“operational” negligence (and other legal) claims. 
Three of the speeches made for the majority in Smith diminish the 
integrity of their position on duty of care by refusing to reject the obiter 
suggestion made in Brooks by Lords Steyn and Nicholls that the police could 
be civilly liable to victims of crime in extreme circumstances. This may have 
been intended to indicate that there is no longer a blanket immunity of the sort 
disapproved in Osman v UK and further undermined by the decision Swinney. 
Lord Brown cites as an example of what Lord Steyn called “outrageous 
negligence”35 the case of Edwards v United Kingdom,36 where a remand 
prisoner was beaten to death by his cell-mate, despite calls for help. At the 
same time, while doubting the utility of the concept described for limiting 
police liability in negligence, Lords Carswell and Phillips recognise the 
strength of the facts in Smith and concede that the case might be approaching 
the hypothetical extreme described in Brooks.  
There are two scenarios which the courts have regarded as trumping the 
arguments against the finding of a duty of care in our type of case.  The first 
consists in a finding of assumption of responsibility.37  In Smith, Lord 
Bingham partially bases his dissent on the proximity between the police and 
the claimant, saying that their visit to him, followed by the giving of advice, 
constituted an assumption of responsibility for his safety.38 Lord Brown also 
recognises the potency of assumption of responsibility when founded upon 
close relationships of quasi-employment and custody (in Swinney and 
Edwards respectively)39 and implies that this outweighs the Hill core 
principle.40 The second occurs when proximity is created when a defendant, 
in an ostensibly non-duty situation, acts so as to aggravate the claimant’s loss. 
Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire County Council41 was a case in which a 
fire brigade was held to have assumed a duty of care to the owners of a 
34 At para [137]. Van Colle itself is an example of a human rights action. 
35 Para [34]. 
36 Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 487. 
37 As discussed above, see n 4. This, of course, is a familiar concept used in 
determining duty of care in cases of pure economic loss. 
38 At para [60]. 
39 See also Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1999] 1 All ER 550 where the 
assumption of responsibility was based upon the employment relationship. 
40 At paras [120]-[120]. 
41 [1997] QB 1004. 
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premises when its members attended a fire and took the positive action of 
turning off a sprinkler system, thereby worsening the claimants’ position 
when the fire restarted. This ruling ran to counter to a general bias against 
imposing duties in negligence upon the emergency services.42
Arguably, for the claimant in Smith, his relationship with the police 
worsened his vulnerability. It is worth reflecting upon what measures for his 
own safety he might have taken, had he known the low level of care being 
exercised by the police. For instance he might have remained in London or 
gone into hiding. The facts in Smith can, of course, be distinguished from 
those in Capital and Counties due to the difficulty to identifying a particular 
determinative act comparable to the turning off of the sprinkler system, 
however some degree of proximity is present and it is to be regretted that the 
assumption of responsibility possibility was not more fruitfully explored. 
 
Common Law vs Convention Rights  
 
The courts have yet to reach any resolution on the fundamental question 
of whether an overlap between common law and Convention rights and duties 
provides an argument for deliberately developing the common law in 
conjunction with the Convention or a reason not to do so (that is, the 
argument that when there is already a Convention remedy a common law 
remedy would be redundant).43  
Lord Bingham has been a proponent of the former view, which he put 
forward in a line of cases with parallels to the police cases in testing the 
possible duty of care owed by local authority social workers and medical 
personnel to children and parents affected by care proceedings. He was alone 
among the Law Lords in D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust in 
endorsing the ruling of the Court of Appeal that an immunity accorded to 
social workers in X v Bedfordshire could no longer stand, in the light of the 
HRA.44
In Smith he says: “It seems to me clear, on the one hand, that the existence 
of a Convention right cannot call for instant manufacture of a corresponding 
42 See the other three cases decided along with Capital and Counties, ibid and OLL v 
Secretary of State for Transport [1997] 3 All ER 897. 
43 HRA, s 2(1) imposes upon the courts, in their decision-making, to have regard to 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. This crucial debate has affected other areas of tort law such 
as privacy. See Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
[2001] QB 967 and Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22. Detailed consideration of 
whether or not the Human Rights Act 1998 is a “tort statute” is beyond the scope of 
this case note, however both Van Colle and Smith clearly illustrate its implications 
and significance.   
44 [2003] EWCA Civ 1151 at para [50]. 
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common law right where none exists.”45 However he goes on to summarise 
his position by referring to the Court of Appeal approach to Smith46: “… I 
agree with Pill LJ in the present case that ‘there is a strong case for 
developing the common law action for negligence in the light of Convention 
rights’ and also with Rimer LJ that ‘where a common duty covers the same 
ground as a Convention right, it should, so far as practicable, develop in 
harmony with it’.”47
Lord Hope believes that the common law should stand “on its own two 
feet side by side” with the HRA remedy48 and Lord Phillips implicitly 
concurs. Lord Brown makes the strongest case for maintaining a distinction 
between the common law and rights under the Convention. Arts 2 and 3 of the 
ECHR and ss 6 and 7 HRA make it “simply unnecessary to develop the 
common law to provide a parallel cause of action…”49 Furthermore he asserts 
that “Convention claims have very different objectives from civil actions” 
with the former being to uphold human rights standards and to vindicate rights 
while the latter concerned primarily with compensation.50 It cannot be said 
that the alleged independence of the common law and HRA tort spheres forms 
part of the ratio of Smith and a tantalising debate unfortunately remains 
unresolved.51  
 
Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 187  
 
In his speech, Lord Phillips admits the difficulty courts have in finding a 
valid basis for their policy deliberations. For him, the question would be better 
dealt with by Parliament and to that end he commends the recent publication 
of the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper No. 187 “Administrative 
Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen”.52 This Paper is the latest product of 
an ongoing review of current means of redress, both public and private for 
“individuals who have suffered loss as a result of seriously substandard 
administrative action.”53 Acknowledging the pressures imposed on public 
resources by a situation of generally expanding state liability, the Paper makes 
proposals for reform of both judicial review and private actions in the civil 
45 At para [58]. 
46 [2007] EWCA Civ 325. 
47 At para [58]. 
48 At para [82]. 
49 At para [136]. 
50 At para [138]. 
51 See, for instance, J Steele “Damages in Tort and Under the Human Rights Act: 
Remedial or Functional Separation?” (2008) CLJ 606. 
52 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp187_web.pdf. 
53 Ibid at para [1.1]. 
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courts. These proposals are markedly similar, and for the purposes of the 
discussion the focus will be upon the private law aspect, as that is what would 
replace the tort system under consideration in Smith.  
The Hill-related species of action is an example which features 
prominently in the Law Commission’s justification for the need for reform. 
The Paper refers to Lords’ decision in Van Colle and Smith, which was 
awaited at the time: “Whichever way the issue is decided this time, the very 
fact that it is once again before the UK’s highest court illustrates the uncertain 
and unsettled nature of this area of law.” 54 The Law Commission proposes 
that a new statutory scheme be established based upon corrective justice 
principles and drawing upon the approach to damages of European Union law. 
For private law actions the new scheme would apply only to defendants who 
were public bodies engaged in “truly public” activity in which they are 
“conferring a benefit”. There are seven other required elements of the  
“package”55 but for the purposes of this case note the most relevant is that of 
establishing “serious fault” by the public body.  Liability will not be imposed 
upon a public body unless its conduct has “fallen far below the standard 
expected in the circumstances.” Speaking in tort terms, this shifts the focus 
from the question of duty of care to that of whether an existing duty has been 
breached. It is claimed that this is necessary to more appropriately balance 
“the interests of claimants with the competing demands made on public 
bodies.”  The Paper describes the factors which would be considered in the 
finding of a “significantly aggravated level of fault”, which must “go beyond 
illegality or negligence”. What is being proposed here is effectively raising 
the threshold for breach. This tactic of using a higher standard of care as a 
control mechanism, instead of duty of care, is one in which judicial indecision 
persists. It was specifically rejected by the House of Lords in D v East 
Berkshire and by the ECtHR in Osman v UK56. In Smith, it has been seen 
above that Lords Carswell and Phillips  were reluctant to endorse Lord 
Brown’s suggestion that had this been an “extreme” case, (or “outrageous 
negligence”, as described in Brook) a duty could be found. That also the 
finding of a duty of care by the police in Swinney  undermines the convention 
that duty, not breach, should be the means of upholding the Hill “core 
principle” was unfortunately not commented upon or explored in Smith. 
 
54 At para [4.53]. 
55 For example the reform of rules as to joint and several liability which currently 
burden the “deep pocket” defendants. In addition, the paper proposes the abolition of 
the torts of breach of statutory duty and misfeasance in public office. 
56 The possibility of varying standards of care depending on the nature of the potential 
victim was also disapproved by the House of Lords in Van Colle. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Smith illustrates what for many is an uncomfortable juxtaposition of 
actions under the HRA and common law tort. Cases testing the area of police 
liability to victims of crime, along the question of whether there might exist 
positive duties to protect or warn, continue to nag at the collective legal 
conscience and are not satisfactorily resolved in Smith. The decision in 2009 
in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council57 is evidence that these issues are not 
going to go away and will challenge the House of Lords repeatedly.  Given 
the pressures on parliamentary time and the generally leisurely pace of law 
reform, it seems doubtful that the Consultation Paper, even assuming that its 
flaws can be addressed, will provide a convenient solution to the conundrum. 
Failing that, it is tempting to endorse Lord Bingham’s mantra that wrongs 
should be remedied. This view is not “slightly meaningless”, as asserted by 
Jane Wright,58 but rather it indicates a clear conviction that the legal regime in 
this sector should be more generous to deserving claimants.   
57 Op cit at n 6. Here, the House of Lords rejected a claim (under both the common 
law and the HRA) that a local authority landlord should be under a duty to warn 
tenants of a death threat. It was noted, however, that the case might not have reached 
the Lords had the results in Van Colle and Smith been known (para [78]). 
58 J Wright ‘The Retreat from Osman: Z v United Kingdom in the European Court of 
Human Rights and Beyond’ in D Fairgrieve, M Andenas and J Bell eds Tort Liability 
of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (London: BICL, 2002) pp 79-80. 
